

Identity and Values of the Polish and British Extreme Right

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Abstract

Contemporary democracies, weakened by an increasing distrust in politics and politicians, more frequently have to face up to the threat of radical political movements like extreme right groups and parties. According to Piero Ignazi, the contemporary far-right constructs its identity on the foundations of xenophobia, racism, authoritarianism and an anti-system approach.¹ In recent years, the outcomes of the elections both to the *European Parliament* and national parliaments show that the extreme right is moving from the margins of the political scene into its centre. At the same time, a significant growth of followers of far-right groups is visible amongst the youth that, in response to unemployment and a lack of social stability, seek radical and populist solutions. In order to better understand the present-day extreme right and meaning of their communication codes, it is essential to examine the language they employ, since language fulfils the most important role in creating and reproducing reality. Semantics research shows that words convey certain meanings constituting ideological worldviews. Even a neutral word linked with other words in particular contexts can create new meanings, specific for a given discourse, and/or alter their semantics. The main goal of this chapter is the reconstruction of the linguistic/ideological worldview of the Polish and British extreme right. Comparing the language employed by the *British National Party* and the *National Rebirth of Poland* in their online publications, the author will attempt to identify the core values and elements of far-right ideological concepts, their semantics and communicational functions. The main thesis is that the contemporary extreme right is frequently employing words typical of mainstream politics in order to disseminate extreme views.

Key Words: Extreme right, linguistic worldview, semantics, corpus linguistic, computational linguistic, constructivism.

1. Introduction

The greater or lesser presence of the extreme right in general discourse appears, to a great extent, to be an answer to the current socio-political situation, rather than a result of the attractiveness of the program. Qualitative changes, however, can be observed in its communication. After the niche zines were replaced by Internet websites and, consequently, alternative contents found their way into the mainstream media, a softening of the language used by the nationalists is visible. Contrary to the language of zines — which was radical and hermetic — the language used in online media is characteristic for general political discourse. The meaning of the particular

concepts is, however, constructed according to nationalist ideology. Three communication strategies can be evinced here. Firstly, the contemporary extreme right puts themselves not in the role of aggressors, but that of victims.² Secondly, negative messages are constructed on the basis of neutral or positive meanings. Les Back states that 'the language of hate is increasingly being articulated through invocations of love'.³ Finally, present are 'liquid ideologies', understood as 'ideologies which are capable of assimilating elements that on the face of it seem incompatible'.⁴ The issue of 'Fears and Anxieties' is relevant here for two reasons. Firstly, as my tentative findings show, communication of the contemporary extreme right is based on codes, which are responsible for creating fears, uncertainty, anxiety and hostility towards various social groups. Secondly, as the latest outcomes of the elections both to the *European Parliament* and national parliaments show, the extreme right has been moving from the margins of the political scene into its centre. Moreover, the slogans they disseminate and values they declare should cause concern and anxiety for reasons that will be explored in this chapter.

There are questions around how to define the contemporary extreme right. Until the 1980s, the term 'extreme right' was a synonym for neo-fascism, mainly due to the fact that the only organisation being defined with this name was the *MSI (Italian Social Movement)*, openly referring to the pre-war fascism. New political movements and the radicalisation of some parties in the 1980s resulted in the creation of the contemporary radical right.⁵ Pierro Ignazi characterised it in the following way:

Basically, these parties are anti-system as they undermine the (democratic) system's legitimacy through their discourse and actions. They are fiercely opposed to the idea of parliamentary representation and partisan conflicts, and hence they argue for corporatist or, mainly, direct and personalistic mechanisms of representation; they are against the idea of pluralism because it endangers (the ideal of) societal harmony; they are against the universal idea of equality as rights should be allotted on the basis of ascriptive elements (race, language, ethnicity); and finally they are somewhat authoritarian because they conceive supra-individual and collective authority (State, nation, community) as more important than the individual one.⁶

Features distinguished by Ignazi on the basis of political programs are also present in Internet communication. Amongst ideological items presented online are the following: racism, homophobia, fascism, ultra-conservatism, social Darwinism and white supremacism.⁷

2. Polish and British Extreme Right

The *National Rebirth of Poland (NOP)* was formed in 1981, initially as youth movement. In 1983, it had become a ‘well-regulated national-revolutionary movement having distinct ideology’.⁸ Although the *NOP* underlines its modernity in ideological documents, the communication praxis reveals its anti-modernist attitude. The construct of nationalism consists of the concepts of a strongly hierarchised state and nation. The latter is not based upon voluntary identification with the nation — like in the moderate nationalist theories — but on ‘primordial attachments’.⁹ Important feature of the Polish far-right is also its anti-system attitude, manifested in rejecting the rules of parliamentary democracy and state institutions; their identity is, hence, built in opposition to the current system. The ideological pillars include: anti-imperialism, anti-globalism, anti-multiculturalism, anti-capitalism and the ultra-conservative model of family and religion.

The *British National Party (BNP)* was created in 1982, with its ideology strongly correlated with concepts of the *National Front (NF)*, from which the leaders of the *BNP* — John Tyndall and Nick Griffin — originate.¹⁰ The ideology of the *NF* was based on racism and strong anti-Semitism; hence, fusing ‘the various tendencies of British right extremism, from neo-Nazism to Mosleyite corporationism’.¹¹ In the 1970s, trying to win over the sympathy of the conservatives, fascist heritage was abandoned; however, the new enemy was created: immigrants. In the 1980s, the *NF* came back to radical rhetoric. Anti-capitalism, ‘return to nature’, as well as references to the ‘Third Position’ — an ultra-radical declaration — also appeared as new ideological components.¹²

The *BNP* based their assumptions on elements of the *NF* from the 1970s.¹³ The first leader, Tyndall, postulated forcible resettlement of immigrants and promoted racial violence.¹⁴ In 1995, Nick Griffin proposed even more radical postulates: “‘rights for whites’ could come only from well directed boots and fists’.¹⁵ When Griffin became the head of the *BNP* in 1999, he distanced himself from his radical postulates; instead trying to create the image of party as moderate one, promoting ‘racial nationalism and social justice’.¹⁶ Atton underlines, that despite this turn, the politics of the *BNP* was still based on racism; rather, it is only the language used in communication that has changed.¹⁷

3. Theoretical and Methodological Assumptions

Referring to constructivist theories, language has a constructive character. As Siegfried J. Schmidt pointed out, the specified ‘models of reality’ have been constructed by given communities and societies in the course of history through the processes of interaction and communication within particular systems. ‘Models of reality’ are created on the basis of the ‘collective knowledge’ of members of specific communities.¹⁸ It should be stressed that it is not really important the extent to which the ‘models of reality’ correspond to ‘actual reality’. What is important is that the

‘models of reality’ must *fit* into the world created by a given system (community, society and so forth).¹⁹

In order to understand a given group, the components of their worldview should be reconstructed using discourse analysis. Following Michael Fleischer, discourse shall be understood as a systemic repertoire of signs organising and interpreting the rules, norms and values of an examined group, which are correlated with the socialisation and culture of these environments.²⁰ The discourse analysis involves searching for discursive nuances of given statements, i.e., typical and repeatable features, which differentiate the elements of the given discourse. It is irrelevant, however, what is behind this particular style, manner of utterance and point of view of the person’s statement; it is instead important what in this specific, single manifested utterance indicate general features typical for a given subculture.²¹

Searching for fundamental entities of the extreme right identity, as well as their hierarchisation and semantisation, is possible with the use of corpus linguistics and the concept of ‘key words’.²² In order to understand the particular culture, it is necessary to reconstruct the meanings of the words which are typical of their communication. The ‘keyness’ of the given word is evident in certain situations: the frequency of the occurrence, indicating that the word is not marginal; it is very frequently used in some specific domain (e.g. moral judgements, sphere of emotions); it is at the centre of the whole phraseological cluster.²³

At the beginning of the research, the frequency lists were generated for two corpora to determine which words are the most common in the particular corpus.²⁴ The next step was the process of identifying key words and the most frequent collocations. As Wierzbicka claims, the frequency of words is not everything, but it can be important and revealing.²⁵ Not all high frequency words can be recognised as ‘key words’. Some of them are important, because they provide important information; yet, they are not responsible for creating meaning, especially ideological ones. This, therefore, means that words have to be examined in the contexts in which they occur; on the basis of this process, keywords and their semantics can be established.²⁶ The next part of the analysis was examining collocations. As John Sinclair states, the meaning of the given word in the communication of particular groups does not always correspond to the vocabulary definition, since the final sense is also affected by words co-occurring with the word in question.²⁷ Michael Stubbs maintains that collocations are often the structures characteristic of specific subcultures, they are ‘nodes around which ideological battles are fought’.²⁸ Examined corpora consisted of publications coming from the *BNP*’s and the *NOP*’s websites — both of these consisted of around two hundred thousand words. Due to research and time limitations, the analysis was only conducted on the dominating collocations.

4. Research Results

A. The BNP Corpus

When we look at the 30 most frequently occurring collocations,²⁹ four predominating categories emerge.³⁰ The frequency of the categories *Politics* [357] and *Identity* [304] is almost equal.³¹ Components of the latter can be divided onto three sub-categories: 1) self-referential communications, ex. *British National Party*; 2) collocations, 'British people' and 'ethnic British' are used to emphasise British identity; 3) phrases like 'white girl' and 'young white' indicate racist elements. Although the collocation *British National Party* is important in its communication, it fulfils a mainly pragmatic function: disseminating the party's actions and concepts. Far more important are the following collocations. The first one 'British people' is used in purpose of creating the construct of 'true Britons'. Phrases such as 'we are the British people', 'us the British people', and 'of the British people' are employed to construct this concept. Additionally, this concept is intensified by phrases emphasising actions in favour of the community: for example, 'for the British people'. The code 'British people' does not, however, include all citizens of Great Britain, what is indicated by such distinctive codes as: 'indigenous British people', 'the ethnic British people' and 'non-ethnic British'. The function of these is to create the opposition binary of 'us-them'. Also, the collocation 'ethnic minority' is used for excluding some groups from the construct of 'British people'. What is important is that this collocation refers not only to the immigrants, but also to the Britons originating from other nations, cultures and religions.

There are also contexts depicting the *white man* as a victim of the actions of coloured immigrants. The collocations of 'white girl' and 'young white', for example, are used in contexts referring to the problem of sexual violence. In the BNP corpus, 'white British girls/women' are raped by 'black immigrants'. Extrapolating from this, within communication of the *BNP*, sexual violence is portrayed only as a rape performed by coloured immigrant.

Also, collocations referring to geographical location by the appropriate semantisation are also important codes. The following words, for example, are strongly related with the collocation 'Eastern Europe': 'poor', 'immigrants', 'crime', 'pickpockets' and 'criminals in our jails'. Similarly, the collocation of *Middle East(ern)* is correlated with *North African* and they indicate the sources of inflow of Muslim immigrants. Moreover, even seemingly neutral code of 'foreign aid' is used to criticise the presence of the UK in the *EU*; it is, therefore, responsible for creating the anti-system and Eurosceptical identity. It appears that its construction is based on the following structure: 'Great Britain spends billions of pounds, which are either squandered by the EU or spent in the other countries; while these financial means should support the investments in the United Kingdom and be a support for British families'.

Further to this, collocations which refer to the immigration issues and religious collocations which are related with them can also be included in the important

ideological codes. Their main function is to create the construct of 'the other', symbolising a threat to the idea of 'British identity'. Collocations such as 'mass immigration', 'asylum seeker' and 'illegal immigrant' are also strongly correlated with one another. Upon connecting their semantics with contexts of the collocations referring to specific geographic regions, the following picture emerges: threats to the British identity come from Northern Africa, Middle East and Eastern Europe. This picture is strengthened by the following phrases: 'flood of illegal immigrants', '[the] million Muslims waiting to get them to Europe' and 'Muslim invasion by fake asylum seekers'. The main function of this type of communication is to portray Europe and the UK being 'flooded' by immigrants who deprive Britons of jobs and are a threat to the 'indigenous identity'. The *BNP's* strategy is to exaggerate this problem, by creating the image of the immigrants as frauds and criminals. It is perfectly visible in the case of the collocation 'asylum seekers'. Within this, its left contexts are linked, amongst the other, with such words as: 'fake', 'so called' and 'bogus' [asylum seekers]. The right side contexts also convey negative connotations with the word 'immigrant': [asylum seekers and] 'illegal immigrants', 'economic immigrants' and 'foreign criminals'. Subsequently it translates — in opinion of the *BNP* — into the increasing crime rate from the side of 'the others'.

B. The NOP Corpus

In the case of the *NOP* corpus, the outcomes are not so apparent. The homogeneity of Polish society and the still insignificant number of immigrants and Muslims causes that the Polish extreme right builds its identity on other than the *BNP* components — history plays the most important role here. The construct of 'the other' has also been functioning; although it consists of quite different elements. Despite the fact that references to the immigration issues and actions against the 'Islamisation of Europe' have recently appeared in *NOP* publications, these issues are still weakly emphasised. 'The other' in communications of the Polish nationalists are mainly LGBT groups presented as the threat to Polish culture, especially to the notion of the 'natural family'. In this case, 'the other' symbolises the spiritual and moral decline of the Western world.

As it transpires, communication of the *NOP* has mainly been self-referential in nature.³² The majority of collocations appear in contexts referring to the names and activities of Polish and foreign nationalist movements.³³ The name of the Polish organisation appears over four times more than its British counterpart in the *BNP* corpus. It appears, however that the semantics of particular elements is extremely important in creating the identity, stability and unity of the nationalist movements.³⁴

Great Poland is the only ideological collocation in this group. It refers to the idea of the pre-war politician, Roman Dmowski, who is an iconic figure for the Polish nationalists. The construct 'Great Poland' is based on the ultra-nationalist and ultra-catholic concept of the state. The following collocations often co-occur with the phrase 'Great Poland': 'Great Catholic Poland' and 'Great National Poland'. The

collocation 'Serbian Kosovo' also plays an important function. On the one hand, it expresses solidarity towards Slavic and Christian nationalists; at the same time, it is used to object to the *Islam's threat*. On the other hand, failing to recognise the independence of Kosovo is aimed against separatism and the dismantlement of the territory integrity of countries.

While the historical contexts almost did not appear in the *BNP* corpus, the Polish extreme right actually build their identity on the basis of history; although it should be highlighted here that historical events are often the subject of nationalistic reinterpretation. The nationalists, in particular, celebrate those historical anniversaries, which allow them to emphasise their radical anti-communism stance. An example of this is their construction of ideological codes via exploitation of martial law, which was declared in Poland in 1981.³⁵ On the level of general discourse, this event is not clearly interpreted in a negative way, as it took place some years ago; yet, the Polish nationalists impose their own interpretation, considering the martial law enacted as the biggest communist evil. This, therefore, means that anti-communist slogans are widespread in their communication. Similar functions are fulfilled by codes, *Cursed Soldiers* and *National Armed Forces*.³⁶ The most prominent theme emphasised by the *NOP* value is not the heroism of those squads, but their anti-communism. Moreover, the *NOP* mainly refers to its anti-Soviet and anti-German attitude and ultra-Catholic values.

It should be stressed out that although there are numerous references to religion in the nationalist manifestos and on flags and banners, these are hardly present in their everyday communications. The nationalists from the *NOP* — to the same extent as their British mates — also hardly speak about other elements of social system.

5. Conclusions

Presented here, the research process illustrates the possibility of identifying the values of radical political groups. Discussed here are not the values of the single individual but of the whole groups. With this in mind, values should, thus, be perceived from the perspective of the systems theory, maintaining that 'values are objectives to which systems strive in their behaviour'.³⁷ Considering this, I, therefore, propose the following definition: X is a value equals X is an item controlling system behaviour, providing hierarchy and stabilising the given social system, as well as allowing for the system to realise determined goals.

Four fundamental values emerged from the analysis of the *BNP*'s communication: true Britons (as the main concept), racism, anti-immigration and the *European Union*. What is perceived as an anti-value in the general discourse, hence, presents a real value for British nationalists — I also think it is common for all European nationalists. The construct of the *EU*, which is still of some value to Europeans, is an anti-value for the *BNP*.³⁸

As the *NOP* corpus shows, values or anti-values are not always easy to find. In the case of the communications of the Polish nationalists, racism, for example, is

masked in the ethno-pluralistic concept; it is constructed through the exclusion of the specific entities, used to create a distinctive division *us-them*. The words which are carriers of the values in the communication of the extreme right can have completely different meanings than in general discourse. The best example of this is the construct of 'Palestine'. The contexts referring to Palestine on the face of it express solidarity with Palestine; in fact, their main function is to attack Israel and mainly Jews.

In this chapter, only an overview of the results was presented. The entire research project is focused on examining whether common or distinct values can be discussed in the communication of nationalist movements.

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Notes

¹ Piero Ignazi, *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 1-3.

² Chris Atton, 'Far-Right Media on the Internet: Culture, Discourse and Power', *New Media & Society* 8 (2006): 574-582.

³ Atton, 'Far Right Media', 576.

⁴ Les Back, 'When Hate Speaks the Language of Love' (Paper presented at the Social Movement Studies Conference, London School of Economics, London, April 2002).

⁵ Ignazi, *Extreme Right Parties*, 1.

⁶ Ibid., 2.

⁷ Atton, 'Far-Right Media', 576; see also Peter Brophy, Jenny Craven and Shelagh Fisher, *Extremism and the Internet* (Manchester: Centre for Research in Library and Information Management, 1999).

⁸ 'Presentation of Our Movement', *National Rebirth of Poland*, Viewed on 13 August 2015, <http://en.nop.org.pl/presentation-of-our-movement/>.

⁹ See: Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism. A Critical Introduction* (London; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 53-55.

¹⁰ Ignazi, *Extreme Right Parties*, 175-177.

¹¹ Ibid., 177.

¹² Ibid., 181-182.

¹³ Ibid., 182.

¹⁴ Atton, 'Far-Right Media', 576.

¹⁵ Ibid., 576.

¹⁶ Ibid., 576.

¹⁷ Ibid., 577 provides the following example from the BNP website: ‘Q: The politicians and the media call the BNP “racist”? Is this true? A: No. “Racism” is when you “hate” another ethnic group. We don’t “hate” black people, we don’t “hate” Asians, we don’t oppose any ethnic group for what God made them, they have a right to their own identity as much as we do, all we want to do is to preserve the ethnic and cultural identity of the British people’.

¹⁸ Siegfried J. Schmidt, ‘Kultura a kontyngencja: nauki obserwatora’, *2K: Kultura i Komunikacja* 1 (2004): 2.

¹⁹ The word *fit* is understood here in the Ernst von Glasersfeld’s sense. See: Ernst von Glasersfeld, *Radical Constructivism. A Way of Knowing and Learning* (London; Washington D.C.: The Falmer Press, 1995).

²⁰ Michael Fleischer, *Konstrukcja rzeczywistości* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2002), 12.

²¹ Ibid., 17.

²² See: Anna Wierzbicka, *Understanding Cultures through Their Key Words* (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

²³ Ibid., 15-16.

²⁴ Refer to Appendices A and D.

²⁵ Wierzbicka, *Understanding Cultures*, 15.

²⁶ See examples in Appendix G.

²⁷ See: John Sinclair, *Trust the Text. Language, Corpus and Discourse* (London; New York: Routledge, 2004).

²⁸ Michael Stubbs, *Words and Phrases: Corpus Studies of Lexical Semantics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 188.

²⁹ Refer to Appendix B.

³⁰ Refer to Appendix C.

³¹ The total frequency of occurrence of the particular category or word is given in square brackets.

³² Refer to Appendix F.

³³ Refer to Appendix E.

³⁴ See: Marcin Pielużek, ‘Kody i semantyki w komunikacji środowisk nacjonalistycznych’, *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 3 (2014).

³⁵ The martial law was introduced by the communist government in order to crush the political opposition of Solidarity activists.

³⁶ Due to the controversial past of the partisans (known later as a *Cursed Soldiers*) operating during and after the WWII, only nationalist environments had regarded that formation as national heroes — this was until 2011, when the National Memorial Day for Cursed Soldiers was introduced.

³⁷ Ervin Laszlo, *Systemowy obraz świata* (Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1987), 124.

³⁸ Generally, the construct of the *EU* is an extraordinarily rich concept in nationalist communication. It is composed of the series of smaller evaluative elements:

immigration, changes of social standards, interpenetration of various cultures and religions and their semantics.

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Appendices

Appendix A: The List of the first 50 most frequent words in the BNP corpus

No.	WORD	FREQUENCY	No.	WORD	FREQUENCY
1	PEOPLE	868	26	POLITICAL	191
2	BRITISH	655	27	BBC	182
3	BRITAIN	652	28	UK	170
4	MUSLIM	495	29	POLICY	168
5	PARTY	453	30	WAR	167
6	COUNTRY	431	31	COUNCIL	163
7	EU	384	32	SCHOOL	163
8	LABOUR	384	33	LAW	160
9	GOVERNMENT	366	34	COMMUNITY	158
10	BNP	330	35	ELECTION	158
11	MUSLIMS	290	36	LOCAL	150
12	POLICE	289	37	WORKER	143
13	EUROPE	287	38	GANG	142
14	NATIONAL	269	39	ACT	140
15	IMMIGRATION	266	40	ENGLISH	140
16	NATION	262	41	CRIME	137
17	WORLD	261	42	LONDON	137
18	IMMIGRANT	260	43	MEDIUM	136
19	EUROPEAN	239	44	SYSTEM	136
20	MONEY	229	45	FAMILY	131
21	ISLAM	226	46	MASS	131
22	STATE	222	47	JOB	129
23	ISLAMIC	219	48	UNION	129
24	WHITE	204	49	FACE	128
25	BANK	193	50	CHRISTIAN	127

Appendix B: The list of the most frequent collocations in the BNP corpus

No.	COLLOCATION	FREQ	No	COLLOCATION	FREQ
1	BRITISH NATIONAL PARTY	115	26	RACE RELATION	24
2	BRITISH PEOPLE	85	27	SAUDI ARABIA	24
3	MASS IMMIGRATION	68	28	YOUNG WHITE	24
4	ASYLUM SEEKER	66	29	NORTH AFRICAN	23
5	LABOUR PARTY	66	30	MONEY SUPPLY	22
6	FOREIGN AID	43	31	RAPE GANG	22
7	PRIME MINISTER	43	32	ASYLUM SEEK	21
8	WORK CLASS	42	33	EU MEMBERSHIP	21
9	EASTERN EUROPEAN	39	34	TOWN AND CITY	21
10	MUSLIM TERRORIST	38	35	BNP POLICY	20
11	POLITICAL PARTY	38	36	BRITISH PUBLIC	20
12	ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT	35	37	GENERAL SECRETARY	20
13	WHITE GIRL	32	38	IMMIGRATION POLICY	20
14	GENERAL ELECTION	30	39	ISLAMIC STATE	20
15	LABOUR GOVERNMENT	30	40	BRITISH SOLDIER	19
16	EUROPEAN UNION	29	41	CHILD BENEFIT	19
17	POLITICALLY CORRECT	28	42	MIDDLE CLASS	19
18	WORLD WAR	28	43	MUSLIM POPULATION	19
19	MIDDLE EAST	27	44	WESTER EUROPE	19
20	GREAT BRITAIN	26	45	YOUNG WHITE GIRL	19
21	MIDDLE EASTERN	26	46	ARM FORCE	18
22	POLITICAL CORRECTNESS	26	47	COUNTY COUNCIL	18
23	MUSLIM COMMUNITY	25	48	MUSLIM GROOM	18
24	ETHNIC BRITISH	24	49	NORTHERN IRELAND	18
25	ETHNIC MINORITY	24	50	SHARIA LAW	18

Appendix C: The communication fields. The BNP corpus

POLITICS	
LABOUR PARTY	66
FOREIGN AID	43
PRIME MINISTER	43
POLITICAL PARTY	38
GENERAL ELECTION	30
LABOUR GOVERNMENT	30
EUROPEAN UNION	29
POLITICALLY CORRECT	28
POLITICAL CORRECTNESS	26
RACE RELATION	24
TOTAL	357
IDENTITY	
BRITISH NATIONAL PARTY	115
BRITISH PEOPLE	85
WHITE GIRL	32
ETHNIC BRITISH	24
ETHNIC MINORITY	24
YOUNG WHITE	24
TOTAL	304
IMMIGRATION	
MASS IMMIGRATION	68
ASYLUM SEEKER	66
ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT	35
TOTAL	169
GEOPOLITICS	
EASTERN EUROPEAN	39
MIDDLE EAST	27
GREAT BRITAIN	26
MIDDLE EASTERN	26
SAUDI ARABIA	24
NORTH AFRICAN	23
TOTAL	165
RELIGION	
MUSLIM TERRORIST	38
MUSLIM COMMUNITY	25
TOTAL	63
LABOUR	
WORK CLASS	42

TOTAL	42
HISTORY	
WORLD WAR	28
ECONOMY	
MONEY SUPPLY	22

Appendix D: The list of the first 50 most frequent words in the NOP corpus

No.	WORD	FREQ.	No.	WORD	FREQ.
1	POLAND	1151	26	MONUMENT	178
2	NOP	1008	27	CATHOLIC	175
3	NATIONAL	742	28	RIGHT	171
4	ACTION	643	29	COUNTRY	170
5	POLISH	568	30	GROUP	169
6	PEOPLE	393	31	YOUNG	168
7	ACTIVIST	342	32	UNION	163
8	POLITICAL	325	33	DELEGATION	162
9	NATION	297	34	CAMP	162
10	STATE	296	35	ONR	162
11	POLE	272	36	IDEA	158
12	POWER (POLITICAL)	263	37	MARCH	158
13	POLICE	253	38	INDEPENDENCE	156
14	ORGANIZATION	247	39	PARTY	151
15	GREAT	237	40	RED	145
16	MEMBER	227	41	VICTIM	145
17	EUROPEAN	222	42	POWER (STRENGHT)	145
18	YOUTH	221	43	LEAFLET	142
19	MOVEMENT	209	44	MOTHERLAND	138
20	WARSAW (CITY)	208	45	CIVILISATION	137
21	MANIFESTATION	199	46	COMMUNIST	137
22	NATIONALIST (NARODOWIEC)	198	47	WROCŁAW	137
23	EUROPE	194	48	SLOGAN	136
24	REPRESENTATIVE	190	49	COMMEMORATION	133
25	MEDIA	181	50	SOCIAL	133

Appendix E: The list of the most frequent collocations in the NOP corpus

N o.	COLLOCATION	FREQ.	No.	COLLOCATION	FREQ.
1	NATIONAL REBIRTH OF POLAND	467	26	NATIONAL ARMED FORCES	30
2	ALL-POLISH YOUTH	96	27	LOVE POLAND	29
3	ZAKAZ PEDAŁOWANIA (NO WAY FOR GAY)	94	28	SERBIAN KOSOVO	29
4	NOP ACTIVIST	89	29	CURSED SOLDIERS	27
5	EUROPEAN UNION	83	30	AUTONOMOUS NATIONALISTS	25
6	NATIONAL MOVEMENT	56	31	ACTIVIST AND SYMPATHIZER	25
7	NATIONAL RADICAL CAMP	52	32	KONRAD BEDNARSKI	25
8	NATIONALIST ACTICIST	50	33	MATIONALIST MOVEMENT	25
9	GAZETA WYBORCZA (NEWSPAPER)	44	34	INFORMATION ACTION	24
10	HRISI AVGI [GOLDEN DOWN]	38	35	NATION AND RADICAL	24
11	MARTIAL LAW	38	36	POSTER ACTION	23
12	WORLD WAR	38	37	DELEGATION [OF] NATIONAL REBIRTH	23
13	NOP DIVISION	37	38	DELEGATION [OF] NOP	23
14	INDEPENDENCE DAY	37	39	SILESIA DISTRICT	23
15	NATIONAL FRONT	36	40	NOP AGAINST	23
16	UPRISING ANNIVERSARY	36	41	YOUN MAN	22
17	NOP SYMPATHIZER	36	42	NOP CARRIED OUT	22
18	INDEPENDENCE MARCH	35	43	INDEPENDENCE DAY CELEBRATION	22
19	CASA POUND ITALIA	34	44	AUTHORITIES [OF THE] COUNCIL	22
20	HOLY MASS	32	45	NOP'S ACTION	21
21	NATIONALIST RADICAL	31	46	TRIBUTE TO THE VICTIMS	21
22	COMMUNISM VICTIM	31	47	RESIST TO	21
23	GREATER POLAND	31	48	FREE SPEECH	21
24	WWII	30	49	ADAM GMURCZYK	20
25	JUAN IGNACIO	30	50	NATIONAL ANTHEM	20

Appendix F: The communication fields. The *NOP* corpus

IDENTITY	
NATIONAL REBIRTH OF POLAND	467
ALL-POLISH YOUTH	96
ZAKAZ PEDALOWANIA [NO WAY FOR GAY]	94
NOP ACTIVIST	89
NATIONAL MOVEMENT	56
NATIONAL RADICAL CAMP	52
NATIONAL ACTICIST	50
HRISI AVGI	38
NOP DIVISION	37
NATIONAL FRONT	36
NOP SYMPATHIZER	36
INDEPENDENCE MARCH	35
CASA POUND	34
NATIONAL RADICAL	31
GREAT POLAND	31
LOVE POLAND	29
SERBIAN KOSOVO	29
AUTONOMOUS NATIONALISTS	25
TOTAL	1265
HISTORY	
MARTIAL LAW	38
WORLD WAR	38
INDEPENDENCE DAY	37
WARSAW UPRISING	36
COMMUNISM VICTIM	31
II WORLD WAR	30
NATIONAL ARMED FORCES	30
CURSED SOLDIERS	27
TOTAL	267
POLITICS	
EUROPEAN UNION	83
MEDIA	
GAZETA WYBORCZA	44
RELIGION	
HOLY MASS	32

Appendix G: Concordances for the word 'British' (examples)

Key-Word-In-Context WORD: (examples)		(KWIC) British
Bursting from TV studio to the papers Mr Cameron is dashing around as Mr Tough-Guy, come to solve all of the problems that the ethnic	British	are quite rightly worried about, when it comes to the destruction of our identity and culture as ethnic peoples of these Islands.
After so many years of banging our heads against mainstream attitude that the tide of Islam is the best thing since sliced bread enriching our society, many many ethnic	British	are starting to realise that Islam is about conquest and not diversity and integration.
The EU wants to take over the running of	British	armed forces and create a European Defence Force.
EU wants control of	British	Armed Services - so they can tell the Russians what to do
The Islamist savage was swooped on by police as he made his way toward a	British	army barracks in London carrying a rucksack containing a 12 inch knife, a hammer and an Islamic flag.
Restore	British	assets
Despite all that, the Director of Service Prosecutions Andrew Cayley QC - who is responsible for prosecutions of service personnel – has shamefully confirmed that the UK will co-operate fully with the preliminary examination by the prosecutor, but added that, in any case, the	British	authorities are conducting their own 'criminal investigations' through the Iraq Historical Allegations Team (IHAT) established in 2010.
Yet again, we witness the	British	authorities bending over backwards to facilitate the growing number of Muslims in Britain.
Illegal immigrants leave Britain to evade deportation by	British	authorities here, but some are being smuggled back in to Britain after being registered as asylum seekers in Italy.
	British	backlash to impending Roma influx
British children are now unable to enjoy the traditional	British	bangers and mash because it upsets Muslim sensibilities.
According to the press, he has been told by top Army brass that he and his family face a kidnap threat from	British	-based Muslim terrorists.

Concerning those	British	based Muslims being stopped from heading of to Islamo-hell-land of ISIS, he spewed out: ‘You know I think it is completely outrageous that anyone nowadays that wants to travel to Iraq and Syria is being treated like a terrorist.
Still on the subject of Muslim radicals, has anyone noticed that the media and government still try to tell us only around 600	British	based Muslims have go and fought in Syria or Iraqi.
Some 21.3 per cent of	British	based Muslims have never worked, a figure that excludes full-time students. For Britain as a whole, the figure is just 4.3 per cent.
You see, back in 2013 in the Autumn, the French leader Francois Hollande told the British media that French security agencies believed that over 750	British	based Muslims were fighting in Syria and remember that is before Iraq imploded.
If it’s not Eastern European crime gangs bringing in women and forcing them into prostitution its	British	based residents smuggling Africans, Muslims or people from Asia in as slave workers, cheap labour or simply helping them gain illegal entry.
For it was the BNP who back in 2001 warned of the Muslim production line rape of young white	British	girls by Muslim rape gangs. And what did Labour do?
It took the issue to become a Times newspaper article to make the British establishment wake up to the rape of	British	girls by Muslims.
Only after BNP Legend Marlene Guest’s decades-worth of research led to an independent inquiry and uncovered the horrific extent of the grooming, drugging and gang raping of young	British	girls by Pakistani gangs, did the media report the facts and the corrupt Establishment could no longer cover it up.
If only someone in authority was willing to listen to what he and the BNP were saying back in 2001, if they had maybe many of these young girls could have been saved from rape and the most appalling perversions of sexual abuse by these paedo gangs. By ignoring his warnings many young ethnic	British	girls have grown up with fear and terror because of abusing Muslim paedo gangs.

Those convicted in Simon Danczuk's constituency for grooming of white	British	girls in May 2012, included 8 men of Pakistani origin and one from Afghanistan. Judge Gerald Clifton who sentenced the men said they treated the girls 'as though they were worthless and beyond respect' he added 'one of the factors leading to that was the fact that they were not part of your community or religion'.
Recall Rotherham? Despite the BNP warning of the horrors suffered by hundreds of young	British	girls in Rotherham at the hands of Pakistani rape gangs, Cameron and his multicultural authorities continued to ignore them and instead, did everything they could to silence and shut down the BNP.
· 1.1 The reported convictions of men for sexual grooming of white	British	girls, almost always involve men of Pakistani origin.
The	British	government under weak David Cameron has decided not to ban these murdering scum for life but if they want to get back to Britain they will have a two year period ban where they could not come back, and if traced face a court case with jail time.
The Academy states the girls were not radicalised there, the Mosque state the radicalisation did not occur in their building, Scotland Yard and The Met reject the suggestion they are to blame, the families know 'nothing' and the Turks blame the	British	Government.
Yes, the	British	governments still want to be seen as playing cricket and jolly decent fall over themselves to give away billions in money that is borrowed in the first place, since we are in massive debt as a nation.
They underestimated you, and they underestimated our collective determination to put right the wrongs brought about by successive anti-	British	governments.
Instead of giving the racist white and	British	hater Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe over £100 million a year, the Argentinians £9 million,

		oil rich Nigerian L450 million a year.
In the meantime, the ethnic	British	have won a small victory in Exeter.
This has to end and it can only be tackled in two ways. Either the EU deport straight back all those attempting to get to Europe and that will only be done if we elect anti-mass uncontrolled immigration MEP's or by Britain leaving the EU, which we in Scottish BNP believe would trigger other countries leaving eventually, once they see the	British	having full control of their borders.
Why are we	British	having to foot the growing bill that the Romanian crime wave across Britain is costing us?